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 What we now call the Trafalgar campaign took place over the spring and summer of 1805. French, Spanish, and British fleets raced back 
and forth across the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Orders flew from London 
and Madrid, and especially from Boulogne, where Napoléon was camped with 
165,000 men preparing to invade Britain. Confusion was the order of the day. 
French admirals often executed one set of orders, only to learn later that other ad-
mirals were executing an entirely different set. The 
Spanish, recently coerced into the war, struggled to 
catch up with their French allies and prepare their 
fleets for sea. The British, stretched thin owing to 
mismanagement during the recent peace and the 
challenge of fighting two peer competitors at once, 
desperately searched for the French and Spanish 
fleets they had failed to blockade in port. Yet by the 
time Vice Admiral Lord Nelson stepped ashore in 
England for the last time in August 1805, having 
crossed the Atlantic twice, the chaos had resolved 
itself into a large British fleet blockading an even 
larger Franco-Spanish Combined Fleet in Cádiz. It 
was, in effect, the end of the Trafalgar campaign. 
The actual battle, which took place two months 
later, was something of an anticlimax, strategically 
speaking.
This article focuses on one little-noticed aspect 
of the Trafalgar campaign: the role of British vice 
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admiral Sir John Orde. It is not an obvious point of inquiry, as there is a well-
established historical consensus about Orde’s actions, which can be summarized 
as follows. Orde commanded a detached squadron of five ships of the line tasked 
with blockading a similarly sized force of Spanish ships in Cádiz. On 9 April 1805, 
Orde was surprised to see a fleet of eleven French ships of the line sail through 
the Strait of Gibraltar. The Toulon Fleet, commanded by Admiral Pierre-Charles 
de Villeneuve, had managed to escape Nelson’s watching frigates. As the French 
approached Cádiz, Orde was faced with odds of three to one and caught between 
the two enemy forces. He sensibly withdrew. Assessing the strategic situation, 
Orde knew that for Napoléon to launch an invasion flotilla, the French needed 
to gain control of the English Channel. To do that required the defeat of Britain’s 
largest fleet, which was positioned to guard against that very possibility, in the 
western approaches to the Channel. Whatever Napoléon’s plans were for the 
French and Spanish ships in Cádiz, the appropriate course of action was for Orde 
to concentrate British forces on the strategic point. He did so, arriving in the 
Channel a month later.
By withdrawing to the Channel, Orde had correctly ascertained Napoléon’s 
plans, which indeed did call for a concentration of naval forces in the western 
approaches. No less a luminary than Sir Julian Corbett claimed that Orde was 
the first Englishman to understand the pattern of what was to follow. Corbett 
credited Orde with “penetrating appreciation,” arguing that with the ships under 
his command he “did everything that the means available permitted.”1 Modern 
historians have followed Corbett’s lead. While the incident off Cádiz usually mer-
its just a few lines in the standard narrative, the most recent authoritative works 
have not seen fit to question Corbett’s account. They roundly praise Orde for his 
sound judgment and strategic insight.2
Interestingly, Orde’s contemporaries were less impressed with his actions. 
Corbett’s assessment (from 1910) cut against the previously established opinion 
of Orde and reversed more than a century of criticism and vitriol. The opening 
salvos were fired as soon as news of Orde’s actions reached London. Fellow naval 
officers were eager to second-guess his decisions. One officer bemoaned that 
Orde had been timid in the face of the enemy, implying that Orde should have 
stayed and fought Villeneuve.3 Others thought he should have sought to join the 
squadron under Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, and still more argued that he should 
have shadowed Villeneuve to the West Indies.4 Orde was a notoriously unpopular 
officer, as this article will explore, but his personal qualities do not explain the 
ferocity of the attacks launched against him in the aftermath of the campaign. 
One letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty said that Orde should be fired, “and 
I hope broke, if not shot, for his disgraceful and cowardly conduct.”5 The echoes 
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of Admiral John Byng’s execution for cowardice in 1757 are unmistakable. Orde 
and his contemporaries were operating in an environment in which British of-
ficers were expected to lead their forces into heroic battle no matter the odds and 
no matter the strategic situation.6
The nineteenth-century criticism of Orde goes too far, and there is no need 
to revive it. We should not judge Orde as Byng was judged. However, Corbett’s 
influential argument is overdue for a critical reading. Corbett’s main thrust—that 
Orde was correct to bring his ships back to the Channel—holds up well. Given 
the balance of numbers and the state of Orde’s fleet, attempting to fight likely 
would have been catastrophic. Orde also demonstrated laudable insight into 
Napoléon’s ultimate purpose. Yet he did not do “everything that the means avail-
able permitted.” At the moment the French fleet appeared off Cádiz, Orde pos-
sessed more information than any other British flag officer. His knowledge of the 
whereabouts and strength of the Combined Fleet placed immense responsibility 
on him to share that information as widely and quickly as possible. He failed in 
this mission, which cost Nelson a good chance of bringing the campaign to a halt 
six months before Trafalgar.
The preceding is a summary of the initial goal of this article: to speak to naval 
historians and, by delving deeply into the archival record, revise the standard 
account of the Trafalgar campaign. But there is more to say. Ironically, the closer 
we examine a historical event, the more uncertainty we uncover. At some point, 
we reach the end of the available empirical evidence and enter a realm where 
individual thought processes are impossible to reconstruct. A fundamental chal-
lenge of empirical historical research is to put ourselves in someone else’s head: to 
empathize, while remaining detached; to use judiciously our knowledge of how 
the story ends; and to describe the known unknowns and retreat in the face of 
the unknown unknowns.
It is easy to become uncomfortable with these processes, and historians often 
are quick to step back from considering individual motivations and impose struc-
tures that seek to make sense of the human experience. This article attempts to do 
both: it asks what role human nature plays in the conduct of naval operations, and 
how we can connect the answer to that question to broader questions of strategy. 
Taking a microscope to one man’s role in a historical event uncovers the tension 
between organizations and their personnel—their fallible, jealous, self-interested, 
human personnel. Strategists behind the scenes must plan; commanders on the 
spot must act. A detailed, intensive examination of one commander’s actions 
raises broader questions of strategy and command structure. Under scrutiny, we 
find the uncertainties of human emotions and motivations. Stepping back, we 
see how the organization in which the man operated set him up for failure. Naval 
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officers are intimately familiar with the human element in naval operations, as 
they grapple with it daily. What follows provides a case study of strategic and 
operational failure in one of the most well-known campaigns in naval history.
Readers will be unsurprised to learn that Orde’s failure was not solely his own. 
The Admiralty set him up for failure by breaking with precedent, ignoring obvi-
ous sources of political and personal conflict, and creating problematic command 
boundaries. In today’s parlance, the Admiralty created a problem along the seams 
of areas of responsibility, leading to a failure of information sharing. Revisiting 
the messy details of the confusing Trafalgar campaign provides an opportunity 
to reassess the role that Orde played in it, and to call more attention to the role of 
Admiralty mismanagement in prolonging it. Orde’s failure to inform Nelson of 
the French fleet’s disposition is an example of a failure to achieve mission com-
mand. Demarcating command responsibilities requires senior commanders to 
communicate their intent; junior commanders to understand that intent; and 
everyone, throughout the system, to trust in commanders on the spot. The chal-
lenge is to choose the appropriate personnel and provide them with structures 
and instructions that help them succeed in rapidly changing tactical situations.7
SETTING THE STAGE
John Orde was born in 1751 to a family of landed gentry in Northumberland. His 
older brother Thomas was a politician who married the natural daughter of the 
Duke of Bolton. As a result, throughout his career John could rely on extensive 
connections with the great and the good. He joined the navy in 1766, was com-
missioned a lieutenant in 1773, and first experienced combat in the American 
Revolutionary War. His big break came when Lord Howe appointed him first 
lieutenant of his flagship in 1777. He then gave him command of a sloop, and in 
May 1778 made him post captain into the frigate Virginia.8
The date of his promotion to post captain is significant. Post captain was the 
highest rank to which an officer could be promoted on merit regardless of previ-
ous rank, seniority, or experience. From there, promotion proceeded by seniority 
alone (although employment depended on a mixture of talent and connections). 
The date of seniority for post captains influenced their seniority for the remain-
der of their careers. The sooner you were promoted to post captain, the sooner 
you would be promoted to rear admiral, although most officers had to wait about 
twenty years.9 Nelson, despite being seven years younger than Orde, was made 
post in June 1779.10 That thirteen-month difference in seniority would prove 
pivotal in later years.
When peace arrived in 1783, Orde was appointed governor of Dominica, an 
island newly acquired by the British in the peace settlement. Here he first came 
into contact with Nelson, who was stationed in Antigua during the peace. At 
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Dominica, Orde worked to improve the harbor and solidify British rule, and 
was successful enough to be rewarded with a baronetcy at the end of his tenure 
in 1790. Yet there were hints of trouble: Orde had clashed with the colonial as-
sembly in Dominica over funding for harbor improvements. Cuthbert Colling-
wood, who had served with both Nelson and Orde in the West Indies, thought 
Orde’s actions were justified. He wrote to Orde, “Men of honour and strict in-
tegrity in a high publick station will ever be obnoxious to a certain description 
of people. . . . I hope you will never return to them, and that the day will come 
when they lament your absence.”11 
Collingwood’s high opinion of Orde was not widely shared.12 Although Orde’s 
career up to 1790 had been successful, the clash with the Dominican colonial as-
sembly foreshadowed the problems that would plague him for the rest of his life. 
An Audit Office investigation of Orde later found that Collingwood’s praise was 
unwarranted: in fact, Orde had mismanaged public funds while governor, cost-
ing him £2,420 in penalty fees.13 Not only did Orde demonstrate repeatedly an 
unsavory enthusiasm for profiting off his public service, but he also lacked tact 
and judgment in dealing with fellow officers. The general consensus was that he 
was arrogant and officious, and few captains who served under him enjoyed the 
experience.14 One captain said that he was “a strange high and haughty man to 
all his Captains, who are all but myself at paper war with him; he has given out 
some curious regulations and signals; he works them from morning till night 
with signals.”15 
Orde was promoted to rear admiral in June 1795. Because of the thirteen-
month difference in seniority, Nelson was not high enough on the post captains 
list to join him, and remained a post captain until February 1797. In 1798, their 
paths crossed fatefully. Orde was serving as third in command of the Mediter-
ranean Fleet under the Earl of St. Vincent. A large French expedition was known 
to be preparing at Toulon for an unknown destination, and St. Vincent, stationed 
at the time off Cádiz, detached a small force to monitor it. Orde was in prime 
position to receive command of this detachment, which promised the possibility 
of a glorious battle. Instead, Nelson, fresh off shore leave to recover from the loss 
of his arm, swooped in and received the plum assignment. The appointment of 
the junior Nelson over Orde rankled: he wrote to St. Vincent, “I cannot conceal 
from your Lordship how much I feel hurt.”16 
Orde’s pain was compounded by interpersonal clashes with Sir Roger Curtis, 
who was both marginally senior to Orde and an officer who reasonably might 
claim to have been at least as disliked in the service.17 Orde made no friends 
in his squadron, either. When one of his captains missed or disobeyed his sig-
nals, he brought all the captains aboard his flagship and publicly reprimanded 
them on the quarterdeck. The episode made news in Britain. One captain 
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requested a court-martial to clear his name—hardly an indication of effective man 
management by his admiral.18 Not only was Orde struggling to get along with fel-
low officers, but the result of Nelson’s detachment was in fact a great fleet victory. 
The Battle of the Nile in August 1798 saw Nelson become the most famous naval 
officer of his generation, solidified his reputation as a daring tactician, and elevat-
ed him to the peerage as Baron Nelson of the Nile. Orde’s jealousy was palpable.
St. Vincent eventually became so fed up with Orde that he sent him home, call-
ing him “a vain ignorant supercilious creature.”19 Orde appealed to the Admiralty, 
requesting that St. Vincent be court-martialed. The Admiralty gently tapped St. 
Vincent on the wrist instead, so Orde waited until St. Vincent, who was in poor 
health after two years at sea, returned to England in June 1799. After granting 
him four months to recover, Orde challenged him to a duel. While dueling had 
long been essential to the maintenance of a gentleman’s honor, it was generally 
in decline in this period, especially in wartime. Orde—stalking an ailing, sixty-
four-year-old man around Essex—looked ridiculous. Lord Spencer, the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, was flabbergasted at Orde’s behavior and asked the king 
to intervene. St. Vincent was forbidden from fighting, which came as a relief to 
all, and Orde had to give a surety of £2,000 to keep the peace.20 
Orde’s disgraceful performance should have ended his career. For the next five 
years, it appeared to have done so. In 1801, St. Vincent became First Lord of the 
Admiralty under the Addington administration. That same year, Nelson—who 
nearly had ruined his career in Naples after the Nile—once again justified all the 
support he had received from St. Vincent and other senior officers by performing 
admirably at the Battle of Copenhagen. Orde languished ashore unemployed on 
half pay, secure in the knowledge that St. Vincent would never consider appoint-
ing him to an active command.
Two events rescued Orde from discreditable obscurity. First, the brief peace 
brought about with the 1802 Treaty of Amiens collapsed with the British declara-
tion of war in May 1803. War naturally increased employment chances for of-
ficers, although with St. Vincent still at the Admiralty Orde had no prospects. In 
the spring of 1804, rumors began to circulate that the Addington ministry was in 
trouble. Orde saw his chance, writing to the secretary of the Admiralty in March 
to request employment.21 The rumors were correct, and in May William Pitt 
returned as prime minister and St. Vincent resigned from the Admiralty. Orde’s 
brother Thomas, now Baron Bolton, had served as the chief secretary for Ireland 
in the 1780s and worked closely with Pitt on Irish affairs. The new First Lord, 
Viscount Melville, was a veteran politician and close associate of Pitt’s. Bolton 
had retired, but he still could advocate for his brother’s career with his former col-
leagues. Despite Orde’s general unpopularity, he did retain some friends among 
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naval officers who thought St. Vincent had treated him poorly. Admiral Sir Wil-
liam Cornwallis campaigned heavily on his behalf, keeping Orde informed of his 
progress throughout the summer of 1804. As commander in chief of the Channel 
Fleet—the navy’s most important active-duty command—Cornwallis was a pow-
erful ally.22 In August of that year, Sir John Colpoys, one of the members of the 
Board of Admiralty, hinted that Melville might be able to find Orde a position.23 
When the good news of his appointment officially arrived in October, Orde re-
ceived letters of congratulations from a number of prominent officers, including 
Sir James Saumarez and Sir Andrew Snape Hamond, former comptroller of the 
Royal Navy.24 Orde now had a chance to rescue not only his career but also his 
reputation among his peers.
ORDE IN COMMAND
Melville gave Orde command of a small squadron off Cádiz. In September 1804, 
British squadrons were responsible for blockading French squadrons in Toulon, 
Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, not to mention maintaining superiority in the 
Channel and the North Sea to monitor Napoléon’s invasion preparations. Spain 
was not a belligerent, but the British admiral blockading the French squadron 
holed up in Ferrol was convinced that the Spanish would declare war once they 
received a shipment of treasure from South America. The cabinet acted on this 
intelligence by ordering four British frigates to seize that treasure in October. In 
an attack delivered without warning and without a declaration of war, three Span-
ish ships were captured and the fourth exploded, killing innocent passengers and 
inflaming international opinion against the British.
War with Spain may well have been inevitable, but the capture of the treasure 
ships certainly accelerated the timeline and made an already dangerous strategic 
situation significantly worse. Spain’s declaration of war doubled the number 
of ships of the line facing the British and necessitated additional blockades of 
Spanish ports. Nelson, commanding the Mediterranean Fleet, could spare no 
additional ships to watch Cartagena or Cádiz, so Orde’s squadron was sent from 
Portsmouth to blockade Cádiz.25 
A glance at a map will tell readers that Cádiz is on the Atlantic rather than the 
Mediterranean coast of Spain, and it is reasonable to wonder why the commander 
in chief of the Mediterranean might be held responsible for enemy forces there. 
According to the Admiralty, the Mediterranean Sea and the Mediterranean com-
mand were two different things. The sea, it was generally agreed, was bounded 
in the west by the Strait of Gibraltar; British Mediterranean fleets, however, fre-
quently needed to be stationed west of the strait. Some reasons were geostrategic: 
Cádiz was a major Spanish naval base, and the area between the strait and Cape 
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Saint Vincent was trafficked heavily by ships transiting between northwestern 
Europe and the Mediterranean. Other reasons were practical, as British forces 
could not always depend on well-stocked naval bases in the Mediterranean.
Still, stationing the Mediterranean Fleet outside the Mediterranean was less 
than ideal. From at least the middle of the seventeenth century, the British had 
made concerted efforts to obtain secure naval bases in the sea itself, or at least 
in locations more convenient to the sea than Lisbon. Tangier showed initial 
promise, even though it is on the Atlantic side of the strait; unfortunately, it 
lacked a safe harbor and was difficult to protect from land-based attacks. A bold 
assault was launched against Cádiz in 1702, not only because capturing it would 
sever the connection between Spain and its Atlantic empire, but also because it 
would make a suitable base for Mediterranean operations. The attack failed, but 
it demonstrates that Cádiz long had been thought of as being connected to the 
Mediterranean. Success finally came with the capture of Gibraltar in 1704, but 
little changed immediately; like Tangier, Gibraltar had no anchorage and only 
Cape Spartel
Cape Saint Vincent
Gibraltar
Tétouan
Cape Trafalgar
Tangier
Lisbon
Lagos
Cádiz
Portugal
Spain
Morocco
Atlantic Ocean
Mediterranean 
Sea
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limited dockyard facilities. The best port in the western Mediterranean—which, 
unlike Gibraltar and the Atlantic ports, could be used as a base for blockading 
Toulon—was Mahón, on Minorca, six hundred miles inside the strait. Captured 
by the British in 1708, it was robust enough to sustain a fleet in the Mediterra-
nean. It did not remain in British hands for the whole century, though, making it 
difficult to rely on as a permanent base.
Even when the British did control Minorca, Mediterranean commanders both 
took responsibility for and relied on Atlantic ports. When the fleet was tasked 
with monitoring Cádiz, it relied on the combination of major allied facilities at 
Lisbon, the developing naval base at Gibraltar, and the provisions available for 
purchase in Tangier. The 1798 dispute between Orde and St. Vincent had arisen 
in precisely these circumstances. Cádiz was, in Admiralty terms, under the au-
thority of the commander in chief of the Mediterranean—in 1804, Nelson.26 But, 
as we have seen, Nelson was junior to Orde; Orde’s command, no matter how 
small, could not be considered subordinate to Nelson’s.
This complication was entirely unnecessary. Both Nelson and Orde were high 
up on the seniority lists as vice admirals, and there were numerous qualified 
candidates for the Cádiz command who were junior to Nelson. The Admiralty 
had more admirals than it could employ; finding an eager rear admiral would 
not have been difficult. Orde’s appointment was not the first time Cádiz had 
been separated from the Mediterranean command, but it was the first time that 
the admiral off Cádiz had been senior to the commander in chief of the Mediter-
ranean.27 The political decision to appoint Orde—not only senior to Nelson but 
with a history of jealous conflict with him—created unnecessary and avoidable 
seams in the command structure and complicated information sharing across the 
Strait of Gibraltar.
Melville’s decision to give Orde an independent command off Cádiz therefore 
broke with long-standing precedent. The particular circumstances of the strate-
gic situation in 1804 make the decision even less explicable. Minorca had been 
returned to the Spanish under the terms of the Treaty of Amiens, meaning there 
was no base from which to watch Toulon. A promising new base at Malta—cap-
tured from the French in 1800—might have counterbalanced Minorca’s loss, but 
it was too far from Toulon to be of use to Nelson. For his blockade, he resorted 
to a hodgepodge of Sardinian harbors and out-of-the-way anchorages, but none 
were capable of supporting his fleet logistically. He had to rely, as many British 
admirals had before him, on long communication and supply lines to North Af-
rica and through Gibraltar to the Atlantic coast.28 
Orde took responsibility for Cádiz beginning 27 October 1804. The Spanish 
had six ships of the line preparing for sea, and there was a French ship of the 
line in port as well. Orde’s squadron of five ships of the line was not particularly 
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powerful. His flagship, Glory, was an imposing ninety-eight-gun three-decker, 
but Defence was an elderly seventy-four and the three others—Ruby, Agamem-
non, and Polyphemus—were mere sixty-fours, barely worthy of a position in the 
line of battle. Technically, the Spanish were not yet belligerents, but Orde’s orders 
were clear: he was to prevent French and Spanish ships from leaving port.29 The 
uncertainty in the diplomatic situation may have contributed to Melville’s failure 
to communicate his intent to Orde. In a personal note, separate from the official 
orders, Melville explained that the Admiralty wanted “to have a small cruising 
squadron outside of the Straits of Gibraltar for the protection of our trade and 
watching the enemy.”30 It was not immediately apparent at the time that the 
difference between the official orders (blockade Cádiz) and the personal note 
(protect trade and watch the enemy) would matter. Yet this seemingly innocuous 
discrepancy would feature prominently later in the competing stories about what 
happened when the French appeared in the strait. Melville’s letter and orders 
confused the intended responsibilities of the command.
For his part, Orde did not seek clarification. He finally had returned from the 
wilderness of half pay, and he knew that his new command was ripe with op-
portunities for glory and enrichment. Whether he was supposed to be protecting 
British trade or just blockading Cádiz, he was back at sea in an area he knew well.
Melville had succumbed to pressure from Orde’s relatives and friends—es-
pecially Cornwallis—in agreeing to appoint him, but he also must have thought 
that Orde’s knowledge of the Mediterranean station and Cádiz made him a 
strong candidate. He was wrong. Orde needed to be managed as Orde himself 
managed—that is, by the book, and with an unnecessary number of instructions. 
What was needed off Cádiz was a junior admiral instructed to communicate 
with Nelson—precisely the arrangement that had been in place in the recent past. 
In 1801, Admiral Lord Keith had taken the bulk of the Mediterranean Fleet to 
Egypt, and the Admiralty had sent Vice Admiral Charles Pole to Cádiz. Pole was 
not only junior to Keith but explicitly instructed to place himself under Keith’s 
command if he had to enter the Mediterranean.31 In 1804, Orde was senior to 
Nelson, and he was operating under muddled orders. The Admiralty had set 
Orde up for failure.
Some of Orde’s official orders were clear: he was instructed on arrival to 
send a frigate to Cartagena to check on Spanish preparations there, but from 
that point on he was “not thereafter to employ any of the ships or vessels under 
[his] command within the Mediterranean, except to procure supplies of stores 
or provisions.” The orders were explicit in limiting his ships to travel “occasion-
ally to Tetuan or Tangier to procure fresh beef.” Orde reinforced these orders in 
lengthy regulations issued to his squadron, telling his captains that even Gibraltar 
was off-limits. This particular regulation had more to do with the presence of 
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plague in the garrison there in late 1804 than it did with questions about his area 
of responsibility, but also it indicated that he was cognizant of the demarcation 
between his area and Nelson’s.32 
Seams of Command
It is easy in retrospect to see how the seam between Orde’s and Nelson’s com-
mands would create communication problems, but it was readily apparent at the 
time as well. Orde attempted to placate Nelson immediately on arrival, writing 
to him in November 1804 and offering to “[seize] every occasion of giving Your 
Lordship any material information” in the hopes that Nelson would do the same 
in return. Orde even went so far as to say that Nelson should “command [him] 
without ceremony,” though such an offer probably was never intended seriously.33 
At the same time, Orde ordered all Nelson’s ships to withdraw into the strait, away 
from the vicinity of Cádiz.34
Nelson was taken aback by the decision to slice Cádiz from his command, but 
he does not seem to have held Orde responsible. The personal conflict between 
Orde and Nelson should not be exaggerated. Nelson had not sought to offend 
Orde when Nelson was appointed to command the squadron off Toulon in 
1798, and he does not seem to have held any animosity toward him. Orde was 
unquestionably jealous of Nelson, but his anger was directed at St. Vincent and 
the Admiralty. Orde eventually served as a last-minute replacement pallbearer at 
Nelson’s funeral.35 
However, the structure of the two commands made friction between them un-
avoidable. Nelson spent much of his time as commander in chief in the Mediter-
ranean frustrated by slow and inconsistent instructions from London. He com-
plained to the Admiralty that he had not been informed of Orde’s appointment 
until Orde had announced it himself.36 Placing a senior admiral with a detached 
squadron squarely on his lines of communication promised to complicate, rather 
than simplify, matters. In February 1805, fully three months after Orde’s arrival, 
Orde attempted to clarify the boundary between the two commands. He sug-
gested to the Admiralty that a north–south line could be drawn through Cape 
Spartel, the southwestern edge of the strait. Orde hoped that drawing the bound-
ary on the Atlantic side of the strait would obviate him from being responsible for 
convoys in the strait. He wrote to Nelson, passive-aggressively: “It will therefore 
I presume, be incumbent on your Lordship to provide for this important duty.”37
Meanwhile, Nelson struggled to work around Orde. In March, Nelson told the 
Admiralty that “a report”—no details were given, but one suspects Orde—had 
reached him accusing him of frequently sending his ships out of the Mediter-
ranean. Nelson flatly denied having done so, “except the [frigate] Amazon which 
was sent to Lisbon with my dispatches.”38 Nelson was being disingenuous here. 
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To receive any communication from London, he had to send ships to Lisbon oc-
casionally. He had given secret orders to Amazon to sail well out to the west to 
avoid Orde’s squadron.39 Orde missed Amazon but intercepted another one of 
Nelson’s ships, the sloop Halcyon. Orde added his own dispatches to Nelson’s and 
required Halcyon to call at his squadron on its return. It was nearly impossible 
for Nelson to bypass Orde without violating the command structure arrangement 
or practicing deception.40 
Conflict over Prize Money
What really frustrated Nelson about Orde’s appointment was that Orde’s squad-
ron was in perfect position to profit from the declaration of war against Spain. 
Prize money was the lifeblood of naval warfare, and most officers thought that 
there was no better time to make a fortune than at the beginning of a war, when 
the enemy’s merchant ships were likely to be at sea. Admirals claimed an eighth of 
the value of every prize captured by ships under their command, but since Orde 
did not report to Nelson, Nelson had no claim on prizes captured by Orde’s ships. 
Nelson’s friends commiserated with him: “I have never felt more indignant than 
as Your Lordship’s account of the Admiralty’s treatment of you,” wrote Alexander 
Ball.41 Another correspondent expressed similar sentiments, damning Melville 
(“the Scotch Lord”) and writing, “I am very sorry to hear . . . that Sir John Orde is 
come to skim the cream of the first of the Spanish War off Cadiz.”42 
The cream was very rich, in the end. By mid-December, Orde was already re-
questing Admiralty instructions about what to do with all the money he had on 
board the ships in his squadron. The frigate Lively captured a single ship worth 
£180,000, only to be topped by Polyphemus capturing a Spanish frigate carrying 
1,215,000 Spanish dollars plus bark and cocoa. Collectively, the squadron cap-
tured somewhere between 2.5 and 4 million Spanish dollars, which Orde eventu-
ally sent back to England in Lively.43 If the command off Cádiz had remained a 
part of Nelson’s Mediterranean Fleet, then a share of the bounty would have been 
Nelson’s; instead, it was Orde’s. If Orde congratulated himself on having balanced 
his karmic ledger with Nelson, the evidence has not survived. We can be certain 
that he was immensely pleased with the haul, even if there were significant legal 
battles still to be fought about whether the Spanish ships had been captured be-
fore the official declaration of war.44 
Orde’s enthusiasm for prizes soon got the better of him, however. The routine 
he established while blockading Cádiz was more relaxed than that of his arch-
enemy, St. Vincent. In 1798, in the wake of the great mutinies at Spithead and the 
Nore, St. Vincent had enforced a close blockade to keep his squadron occupied 
and disciplined. The ships were so close to Cádiz that officers had their laundry 
done in town and individuals in the city could be discerned easily from the 
decks.45 Orde took a more reasonable approach, generally staying ten to fifteen 
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miles offshore.46 Such a distance provided flexibility, as he was close enough to 
monitor enemy preparations from his flagship. Orde deployed most of his frig-
ates and sloops elsewhere, and did so aggressively. Lively, Amphion, and Wasp 
received regular two-week cruises intended to capture prizes, while Polyphemus’s 
capture of the valuable Spanish frigate suggests that Orde was even willing to de-
tach ships of the line from his squadron. The more ships cruising, the more likely 
he would be to get an eighth of the value of a prize.47 
The Admiralty was not impressed. On 11 January 1805, their lordships re-
minded Orde of his duty. In a public letter, they accused him of being jealous of 
Nelson’s allocation of frigates because they increased his chances at prize money. 
This was unacceptable: “Their Lordships are unwilling to believe that any officer 
in His Majesty’s Service would consider prize money as an object to which any 
part of the force under his command be primarily appropriated.” They expressed 
their “dissatisfaction” that Orde had wasted their time with “correspondence in 
which competition for prize money seems to be the chief if not the only subject of 
discussion.”48 This was strong language indeed. To reprimand a serving admiral 
for greed in an official letter was both shocking and exceedingly rare.
Orde clearly was stung. From his perspective, he had behaved exactly as any-
one in his situation would have. And furthermore he had not failed in his core 
mission: the Spanish were still in Cádiz, after all. The prize money dispute was 
ancillary to that (although he was very disappointed when subsequent rumors 
reached him that Nelson had been given a prize agent in Gibraltar with permis-
sion to lay claim to the prizes captured by Orde’s frigates).
But in any case, the real issue was that his orders had been written poorly. 
While the personal note from Melville had told him that his squadron was in-
tended to protect British trade from Cape Saint Vincent to Gibraltar, his official 
orders said nothing about that; his mission was to blockade Cádiz. His squadron 
was big enough to do one mission or the other, but not both.49
It is easy to imagine Orde keeping himself awake in the middle of the night by 
composing bitter, biting replies to the Admiralty. Nevertheless, the fact remained 
that he once again had managed to annoy his superiors. This time, presumably, 
he did not contemplate challenging one of them to a duel. Instead, in a letter 
written in his own hand and dated 27 March 1805, he resigned.50 The same day, 
Villeneuve sailed from Toulon.
THE FRENCH ARE OUT
Nelson anticipated that, when Villeneuve sortied, he would head east toward 
Egypt. Setting up a long-range blockade, Nelson kept his frigates off Toulon to 
keep an eye on French movements and deployed his fleet in the close waters 
among Sicily, Sardinia, and Tunisia. If the French went east, they would have to 
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pass through these waters, and Nelson hoped to bring them to battle. From 27 to 
30 March, Nelson was south of Sardinia.
Villeneuve left Toulon and initially made his way south to avoid the British, 
who he thought were off Barcelona.51 On 31 March, the French fleet was observed 
at sea by two frigates under Nelson’s command. Active remained to shadow 
Villeneuve, while Phoebe sailed south in search of Nelson. Active, however, lost 
contact with the French that night, and so also went in search of Nelson in the 
morning.52 For Villeneuve the timing was perfect. On 1 April, he learned from a 
Sicilian merchantman that Nelson was not waiting off Barcelona, and he decided 
to turn west.
News that the French fleet was out reached Nelson on 3 April, first from Phoe-
be and a few hours later from Active, but the frigates told him the French were 
sailing south-southwest, indicating a likely destination to the east.53 Nelson spent 
the next two weeks sailing between the south coast of Sardinia and the northwest 
coast of Sicily, waiting to pounce on the French fleet. He spread his frigates across 
the area, hoping to renew contact with Villeneuve.54
Meanwhile, on 7 April, Villeneuve stopped briefly at Cartagena to collect 
the six Spanish ships of the line anchored there. However, on learning that they 
would not be able to sail for thirty-six to forty-eight hours, and probably expect-
ing the British to be close behind him, he raised anchor late on the night of 7 April 
and set a course for the Strait of Gibraltar.55 
At Gibraltar, the early morning of 9 April did not appear to be much different 
from any other. Fisgard, a frigate from Nelson’s fleet, was anchored behind the 
protective mole where it had been for almost four weeks making major repairs. 
Fisgard’s captain, Lord Mark Kerr, busied his crew loading provisions.56 Twenty-
four hours earlier, a convoy of forty-six merchant ships had left Gibraltar for Eng-
land, escorted by one of Orde’s frigates, Mercury, and a sloop. A seventy-four-gun 
ship of the line from Nelson’s fleet, Renown, commanded by Sir Richard Strachan, 
also was refitting at Gibraltar. Strachan sailed with the convoy to provide extra 
protection through the Strait of Gibraltar, known as the Gut.57 Spanish gunboats 
and privateers often took advantage of the fourteen-mile-wide choke point, pick-
ing off merchantmen that strayed too far from Royal Navy protection. Strachan 
parted with the westbound convoy just off Cape Trafalgar at noon on 8 April, 
and by first light on 9 April he had positioned Renown at the southwestern end of 
the Gut, about five or six miles northeast of Cape Spartel, preparing to fight the 
fresh easterly headwind and beat his way back to Gibraltar. Strachan could see the 
Rock rising slowly above the horizon in the early morning light, as Renown made 
headway back through the Gut.
The calmness of the morning was shattered when sails began to appear over 
the eastern horizon. By 10 AM, it was clear that these sails belonged to a large fleet. 
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Kerr signaled Strachan about the strange fleet, then hastily set about making his 
ship ready for sea.58 Strachan also had spotted the ships and was using the fresh 
easterly wind to make all possible speed to the northwest to warn Orde’s squad-
ron off Cádiz, collecting the sloop Sophie en route. By 11 AM, Kerr, still making 
ready for sea at Gibraltar, counted eleven French ships of the line, five or six 
frigates, and two brigs passing through the Gut—no doubt an impressive sight. 
Kerr quickly issued orders to send a recently captured brig east with dispatches 
to warn Nelson.59 By 2 PM, Fisgard’s crew had completed the herculean effort 
of readying their ship for sea. Kerr gave orders to haul Fisgard out of the mole 
at Gibraltar, making all sail westward to take advantage of the easterly wind to 
pass well south of the last known French position. Kerr raced back to England to 
notify the Admiralty that the French were out, but all he knew was that they had 
passed through the strait—nothing more.60 
At 2 PM, Orde and his flag captain both observed a strange ship of the line 
approaching, firing guns, but it was 2:20 PM before they could make out the sig-
nal for “enemy approaching,” and 2:45 PM before they could identify the ship as 
Renown. Orde’s squadron was in a precarious position at anchor nine miles off 
Cádiz. Included in the convoy that had sailed through the Strait of Gibraltar on 
the previous day were six transport ships filled with supplies, and Orde’s ships 
were badly in need of water and provisions. The transports were currently along-
side, and the ships’ yards were employed hoisting provisions on board. When 
Renown made contact, decks were littered with supplies waiting to be lowered 
into the hold, and the squadron was not in a position to set sail quickly, much less 
clear the decks and prepare for action.61 
At that time, Orde could not have known Villeneuve’s mission. There was 
a very real possibility that it was to catch and overpower Orde’s squadron off 
Cádiz, and since the wind was coming from the east, Villeneuve had the weather 
gauge. Accordingly, Orde’s squadron began casting off the transports, throwing 
overboard the casks and staves that had yet to be stored in the hold, and clearing 
for action. Orde busied himself sending dozens of signals, annoying his captains. 
Even working at a frantic pace, it was 4 PM before the ships of the squadron were 
ready to weigh anchor, which they did in company with the transports, and made 
sail to the west, joined by Renown and Sophie. At this point, Villeneuve’s squad-
ron was within sight of Orde’s flagship and was observed to be sailing along the 
coast toward Cádiz. By 7 PM, Orde’s squadron had lost sight of the French fleet 
in the fading light. The immediate threat of action with a superior enemy force 
to windward had passed.62 
After recognizing that his squadron was outnumbered, Orde quickly decided 
to sail west and retreat to the Channel. Whatever plans the Combined Fleet might 
have, Orde could not force it into Cádiz, fight it on equal terms, or (as he later 
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claimed) shadow it without risking disastrous battle. It was also at this time—on 
the evening of 9 April—that Orde first had an opportunity to relay information 
of the French presence to the surrounding British forces and the Admiralty. Orde 
had no way of knowing that Kerr had sent a ship in search of Nelson, nor that 
he had sailed to England. Regardless, Kerr’s intelligence did not include what 
the French had done once they passed through the strait. At that moment, Orde 
knew more about the French disposition and intentions than any other officer 
in the Royal Navy. It was essential to share that information with the Admiralty 
and the commanding officers of other British fleets. Only hours after getting his 
squadron safely under way, Orde gave dispatches to Commander Philip Rosen- 
hagen aboard Sophie and ordered him to “inform [the Channel Fleet] of the Con-
voy sailing and of the French Fleet having passed the Gutt, also the Spaniards hav-
ing 9 or 10 sail of the line ready for Sea.”63 Orde also stated that he did not know 
the Combined Fleet’s intentions, but he was “of opinion it must be westward.”64
Orde correctly gauged that his first action should be to inform the Admiralty. 
However, once Sophie had departed, Orde also had responsibility to spread this 
information across the seams of the surrounding commands. One problem he 
immediately faced was that the wind changed. The easterly wind, which had 
been favorable to his quick departure from the waters off Cádiz and the French 
fleet’s push through the strait, shifted over the course of 10 April to a strong wind 
blowing from the west-southwest. Orde’s squadron therefore made little progress 
toward the west over the next two days, not arriving off Cape Saint Vincent until 
late on 12 April, when the wind shifted again and blew strongly from the north-
northwest. This prevented the squadron from making any northern progress 
until the 19th.65 
During his slow passage, Orde had plenty of opportunities to think carefully 
about how to arrange his forces and communicate his intelligence. On 11 April, 
he ordered the frigate Amphion and two sloops, Wasp and Beagle, to cruise off 
Cape Saint Vincent until they received further orders. Captain Sutton of Amphion 
was directed to inform any British ships passing of the presence of the French 
fleet and to order warships to return to the Channel or, if the French returned 
through the strait, to head to the Mediterranean. Along with these orders were 
dispatches that Sutton was to have delivered to Lisbon.66 On 12 April, Orde 
dispatched the frigate Mercury to Barbados and Jamaica, warning that the Com-
bined Fleet was at large and possibly sailing for the West Indies.67 Orde ordered 
Mercury to call at Madeira en route, “without anchoring,” and forward a letter to 
the East Indies with similar information.68 
At no point after making contact with the French fleet did Orde attempt to 
send any information east to Nelson; instead, he left a letter for Nelson at Lis-
bon, where the chances of Nelson receiving it were low. The Mediterranean is, 
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admittedly, large, and Nelson’s fleet could have been anywhere from Egypt to 
Spain; furthermore, the areas of responsibility as laid out by the Admiralty clearly 
separated Orde from the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, given that his ships were 
allowed to resupply at Gibraltar, it would have been reasonable to leave a letter 
for Nelson there.
Strachan clearly thought that was the correct course of action. In the week 
after joining Orde’s squadron, he sent him five letters, first suggesting, and then 
pleading, that contact needed to be made with Nelson. On 9 April, Strachan told 
Orde that he thought Fisgard was still fitting out at Gibraltar and unlikely to sail 
until the next day, with unknown intentions, but possibly east to find Nelson. 
He also stressed that he did not know where Nelson was, and feared he had gone 
east to Egypt. The following day, seemingly aware that Orde had no intentions of 
going east or sending news east, Strachan claimed that he may have misspoken 
about Nelson’s location. Nelson was probably somewhere between Sardinia and 
Malta, and would not sail toward Egypt if the French were out with an easterly 
wind. He also said that he thought it likely that Nelson was in pursuit of the 
French, possibly a couple of days behind. In his third letter, Strachan reinforced 
this guess, and also stressed that Renown was critically low on water—a clear 
hint that he thought Orde should let him return to Gibraltar. In his fourth and 
fifth letters, written as Orde’s squadron struggled to make northern progress, he 
doubled down on the poor condition of Renown, which he said was leaking more 
every day, and with masts and rigging in such poor condition that he feared they 
would be carried away in a strong wind. From his tone, it is clear that Strachan 
did not wish to leave the vicinity of the strait or to be detached from Nelson’s 
fleet. He grew increasingly desperate to return to Gibraltar, although once the 
squadron began making progress north he resigned himself to his fate.69 
In a personal letter to Nelson written two weeks later, Strachan expressed his 
frustration with Orde’s decision-making. Strachan said he had planned to return 
to Gibraltar once he had warned Orde of the French fleet, but Orde forced him 
to join his squadron. Moreover, Orde had taken “Renown from her station at a 
time he had determined to leave Cadiz without entertaining whether the enemy 
proceeded from Cadiz to the westward, or returned up the Mediterranean, or 
whether your Lordship followed them.”70 Strachan and Orde had a fraught re-
lationship even before the incident off Cádiz. In December, Orde had accused 
Strachan of lingering in the strait in pursuit of a prize, disobeying direct orders 
from Orde to return to the Mediterranean—here again, the seams of the area 
of responsibility created unnecessary conflicts. Orde had taken his complaint 
all the way to the Admiralty, which responded (the day after rebuking him for 
pursuing prizes) that it hoped “from the character which Sir Richard holds in the 
Service, that he will be able to assign such reasons as will remove any unfavorable 
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impression which may have been formed.”71 The Admiralty agreed to investigate 
the complaint, but said in so many words that they highly doubted Strachan had 
misbehaved. Orde’s greed and grating personality compounded the confusion of 
communicating among commands.
Meanwhile, on 16 April, as Orde fought adverse winds off Cape Saint Vincent, 
Nelson first learned the French fleet had been seen off Cartagena. Two days later, 
stationed off Sardinia, he learned that the French had passed the strait—but not 
from Orde or Kerr. Instead, Amazon arrived with intelligence from a Ragusan brig, 
which had seen the French in transit. Nelson had a hard time believing it was not 
a feint, convinced as he was that the Toulon Fleet was destined for Egypt. He de-
tached his frigates and smaller vessels to cover the Barbary Coast in case the French 
sent a secondary expedition east.72 On 19 April, he reluctantly decided to sail west, 
into the teeth of the wind. It was a long and slow fifteen-day passage to Gibraltar.73 
Back in London, the Admiralty was in crisis. On 8 April, Melville had been 
forced to resign following a financial mismanagement scandal dating from his 
time as treasurer of the Royal Navy. His replacement, Admiral Charles Middle-
ton, now ennobled as Baron Barham, did not assume office until 29 April. It was 
not a moment too soon: on his first day news arrived from Fisgard of the French 
escape from Toulon and passage through the Strait of Gibraltar. Pitt came to 
Barham’s office at 2 AM on the 30th to find him hard at work at his desk. They 
ordered Collingwood to take fourteen ships of the line from the Channel Fleet 
and sail to Cádiz.74 
On 4 May, Nelson finally reached Tétouan bay, at the eastern approaches to 
the strait, and took on water and provisions.75 He was surprised to have no new 
news of the French. In a letter to the Admiralty, he expressed his frustration with 
the situation: “I believe my ill luck is to go on for a longer time, and I now much 
fear that Sir John Orde has not sent his small ships to watch the Enemy’s fleet, 
and ordered them to return to the Straits’ mouth, to give me information, that 
I might know how to direct my proceedings.” The key question for Nelson was 
whether to try to guess Villeneuve’s destination. The West Indies seemed likely, 
but, as Nelson put it, he could not sail the Mediterranean Fleet to the West Indies 
“without something beyond mere surmise.” In any case, the Combined Fleet had 
a month’s head start.76 Clearly, Nelson expected up-to-date information, primar-
ily from Orde, when he arrived at the strait. The news that he received—that 
the French had passed Gibraltar and had not returned—was almost four weeks 
old. Ideally, what he needed was word from ships that had shadowed the French 
and determined their destination. Orde had not dispatched any of his frigates or 
cruisers in this capacity. Like Nelson, Orde thought the West Indies were a likely 
destination, and had told the Admiralty and the commanders in the West Indies 
were a likely destination, and had told the Admiralty and the commanders in 
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the West Indies as much. But he had not told Nelson, the admiral most directly 
concerned with the Toulon Fleet.77 
Without fresh information, Nelson passed through the Strait of Gibraltar on 
6 May and arrived at Lagos Bay two days later, where Orde’s supply ships were 
anchored.78 Amphion, Wasp, and Beagle were nearby off Cape Saint Vincent, but 
they had no new information. The only intelligence Nelson gathered was that 
the French had not sailed north and had not been seen in over three weeks.79 
That increased the chances that the French had gone west, but it was only after 
he met Rear Admiral George Campbell, a Scot in Portuguese service, that he had 
any positive intelligence to support that guess.80 On 11 May, a week after he had 
arrived in the strait, he finally made the decision to commit to the West Indies—
thirty-two days behind Villeneuve.81 Orde’s failure to leave any information for 
Nelson cost valuable time and confused the intelligence situation.
Nelson arrived at Barbados on the evening of 4 June, after a twenty-six-day 
passage. This was fast by fleet standards, and certainly better than the thirty-
five-day passage Villeneuve had made a few weeks earlier.82 Nelson immediately 
met with Lieutenant General Sir William Myers, the commanding officer in 
Barbados and the Leeward Islands, and Rear Admiral Alexander Cochrane, who 
had arrived two months earlier in pursuit of a French squadron out of Rochefort. 
Myers had received a letter the day before from the commanding officer at Saint 
Lucia reporting that the Combined Fleet had been spotted sailing south toward 
Barbados or Trinidad. It obviously was not Barbados, so Myers offered Nelson 
two thousand troops from Barbados to help defend, or possibly retake, Trinidad. 
Nelson harbored doubts about the intelligence, but the added need to take ad-
ditional troops to Trinidad convinced him to go south.
The following morning at 9:30 AM, Nelson’s fleet was making sail to the south. 
As Nelson approached Tobago, he received news from a brig sent ahead that an 
American merchantman had reported being boarded by the French off the island 
of Saint Vincent, and that they were sailing south. On the morning of 7 June, Nel-
son’s fleet prepared for battle, expecting the Combined Fleet to be in the channel 
between Trinidad and mainland South America. However, on arriving, Nelson 
found only empty sea. The lookouts who had spotted the French from Saint Lucia 
had mistaken three French frigates for the Combined Fleet, and the information 
the American merchant had provided was deliberately false. As Nelson pondered 
his next move, news arrived that the Combined Fleet had taken Diamond Rock, a 
small, fortified British outpost situated on a tiny rocky island (and commissioned 
as a sloop) about a mile and a half off the southwestern coast of Martinique.83 
Villeneuve had been at Martinique all along—only 140 miles away from Nel-
son when he arrived in Barbados. Only a couple of hours before Nelson sailed 
south toward Trinidad, Villeneuve had sailed north to Guadeloupe, where he 
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embarked troops, and then continued north past Antigua. On 8 June, he captured 
fifteen of the sixteen merchant ships in a homeward-bound British convoy, worth 
five million francs. After interrogating the prisoners, Villeneuve learned of Nel-
son’s presence in the West Indies and decided to return across the Atlantic. On 
11 June, the Combined Fleet set sail for Ferrol.84 
On 8 June, Nelson frantically sailed north from Trinidad, frustrated that he 
had turned the wrong way. At Dominica, he learned that the Combined Fleet 
was heading north, and at Antigua on 12 June he learned that it was returning 
to Europe, although among his captains opinion on its destination was divided. 
Nelson thought Cádiz or Toulon was the likely destination, in part because he 
still thought that the true target was Egypt.85 He set a more southerly course for 
the Strait of Gibraltar—only two days behind his adversary. A few days later, he 
sent a frigate and a sloop ahead to Ferrol to warn the British squadron there in 
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case Villeneuve appeared. Both fleets crossed the Atlantic, initially only a couple 
of hundred miles apart but sailing courses for different destinations. Nelson ar-
rived at Gibraltar on 19 July, where he was disappointed at receiving no news of 
the French.86 
Villeneuve’s luck ran out when he arrived back in European waters. Curieux, the 
brig Nelson had sent ahead, had spotted the Combined Fleet at sea on the passage 
and realized that its course would take it north of the Azores, toward Ferrol. This 
news reached the Admiralty in the early hours of 9 July, and Barham dispatched im-
mediate orders for the Rochefort squadron of five ships of the line to combine with 
the ten ships of the line off Cape Finisterre under the command of Vice Admiral 
Sir Robert Calder. Calder’s fifteen ships of the line intercepted the Combined Fleet 
of twenty ships of the line on 22 July in light winds with a heavy swell and patchy 
fog. After an indecisive battle that evening, both fleets spent several days maneu-
vering for position before Villeneuve, demoralized, sailed southeast for the port of 
Vigo. Although Calder was later court-martialed for not bringing the Combined 
Fleet to battle on the 23rd or 24th, his actions proved to be the strategic victory that 
thwarted Napoléon’s plans for combining the naval power of France and Spain in 
the Channel to cover an invasion of England.87 
It is impossible to say whether Nelson would have caught Villeneuve in the 
West Indies had he received proper intelligence from Orde. However, we can say 
that the near miss was a matter of hours. Had Nelson departed European waters a 
few days earlier, it is unlikely that he would have sailed to Trinidad after arriving 
at Barbados. The bad intelligence that caused him to do so was received in Bar-
bados only a few hours before his fleet arrived on 4 June. Rather, Nelson would 
have considered Martinique, France’s stronghold in the Windward Islands, a logi-
cal point to have begun his search. Nelson also might have been able to prevent 
the French capture of the West India convoy. While this is all speculation, we 
can say that the margins in the Trafalgar campaign were small—matters of hours 
and days. Orde leaving Nelson in the dark was significant, even if the alternative 
outcomes are impossible to know.
ORDE’S DEFENSE
Nelson’s near miss in the West Indies, combined with Calder’s action, resulted in 
the Combined Fleet being shut up, ironically, back in Cádiz, now watched by the 
entire Mediterranean Fleet under Collingwood. Orde had returned to England, 
but his passage had been slow and ridden with angst. After arriving at Spithead 
on 11 May, he was sent into quarantine, stemming from his squadron’s proximity 
to the plague-ridden Gibraltar garrison.88 While awaiting release, he received let-
ters (one of which was quoted earlier in this article) that questioned his actions 
and attacked his character.
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Accused of cowardice, and of failing to do as Nelson would have done, Orde 
proceeded as soon as he could to the Admiralty for an interview with Barham. 
Orde asked whether the Admiralty approved of his bringing his fleet back to the 
Channel; Barham said yes, and then asked whether Orde was interested in being 
employed again. Orde, who clearly had expected to have to defend his actions 
and was eager to do so, was taken aback. He said he would consider employment 
again, but could he please explain his actions anyway? Barham pointed to a stack 
of unopened letters on his desk; Orde got the hint and left.89 Orde never was em-
ployed again. Barham likely asked the question as a courtesy and to avoid being 
accused of treating Orde unfairly. He probably did legitimately approve of Orde’s 
decision to bring his squadron back, but Orde’s behavior in the months—and 
years—prior had disqualified him from future consideration.
Even as early as his retreat from Cádiz, Orde seems to have become increas-
ingly uncomfortable with his own actions. While on the passage from Cádiz to 
Spithead he had written nearly daily to the Admiralty, and each letter contained 
a new justification. In early January 1806, Orde participated in Nelson’s funeral, 
but he was still frustrated by how his active career had ended. Sometime after 
the funeral, he wrote a four-thousand-word defense of his actions, followed by a 
second, six-thousand-word additional defense. Neither is dated, and he claimed 
later that the documents were written confidentially for his friends. Their tone 
is that of a proud, wounded animal. When combined with the letters he wrote 
in April 1805, they create a comprehensive but internally incoherent picture of 
Orde’s thinking.90 
His best defense, as laid out primarily in the letters written on his way back 
to the Channel, comes in his reasonable assessment of the likely plans of the 
French and Spanish. In January 1805, he noted, the Toulon Fleet had sortied and 
attempted to link up with the Rochefort squadron before being forced back by 
poor weather. Orde suggested that the French would not squander the chance 
presented by freedom of movement in the Atlantic. It seemed reasonably unlikely 
that they would return to the Mediterranean if they had the chance to leave.91 
This is the analysis that Corbett rightly praises as insightful, and Orde deserves 
credit for having guessed the outline of Napoléon’s invasion plans—even if Orde’s 
guesses conveniently justified his decision to desert Cádiz.
Less persuasively, Orde claimed he could not have given the Admiralty or 
Nelson any more information about the destination of the Combined Fleet be-
cause he could not track it at sea. He gave many reasons why this was impossible, 
each of varying degrees of legitimacy. Initially, he claimed that his squadron was 
too weak to shadow the Combined Fleet. Glory, Agamemnon, and Renown were 
poor sailors, and Orde correctly pointed out that if he had tried to stay in con-
tact with the Combined Fleet he might have been forced into a disadvantageous 
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battle. At the very least, deploying his full squadron in such a way would have cost 
the Admiralty the use of his ships of the line for an extended period. Tracking an 
enemy fleet with an unknown destination was indeed challenging, and in his later 
defense Orde pointed to Nelson’s own difficulties in having his frigates track the 
Toulon Fleet in the last days of March.
Orde also argued, strangely, that it was impossible to know an enemy’s destina-
tion. He noted that the expedition led by General Lazare Hoche had left Brest in 
1796 and “proceeded for the sake of deception so far to the westward as to strike 
soundings in the Banks of Newfoundland, before they steered for Ireland.”92 Not 
only did targeting the West Indies fit the pattern of Napoléon’s deployments that 
Orde had identified, but there were well-known routes from Cádiz to the West 
Indies, and it beggars belief that a frigate trailing Villeneuve’s ships could not have 
made an educated guess about their destination after a few days at sea. Curieux 
did precisely this when encountering Villeneuve in the middle of the Atlantic in 
June on the return leg.93 
Another strand of Orde’s defense is that Nelson would have been, or perhaps 
should have been, in a better position to act than Orde. Guessing that Villeneuve 
had gone west conveniently made Orde’s decision to go north the correct one. 
Had Villeneuve gone east, he wrote, “I should not have hesitated one moment to 
risk passing the Strait.” How he would have known that Villeneuve had done so 
is not clear, since he had sailed well to the west by the time Villeneuve departed 
Cádiz. He did not let such practicalities impede spinning out hypotheticals. He 
worried in the same letter that entering the Mediterranean would have been met 
with disapproval—recall that his orders strictly prohibited him from doing so. 
In that scenario, as the senior officer, he would have had to assume command 
of the Mediterranean station. He was quick to say that he had no desire to be in 
high command.94 It was Nelson’s burden to bear, and Orde was happy to let him 
carry it. While on the passage back from Cádiz, he expressed confidence that, if 
the French had gone east, “Nelson will be found in condition, with his 12 ships 
of the line and numerous frigates, to act on the defensive without loss, and even 
to hang heavily on the skirts of the enemy’s fleet.”95 Orde wanted it both ways—to 
claim to have been willing to enter the Mediterranean in pursuit of Villeneuve, 
but without having to determine Villeneuve’s course. He went on to argue that 
the Toulon Fleet was Nelson’s responsibility, not his, so he need not have tracked 
it when it appeared off Cádiz.96 Nelson’s fleet was stronger than Orde’s, and the 
Toulon Fleet had been Nelson’s responsibility originally, but the stakes were too 
high to abdicate responsibility in this way, on a technicality.
Orde defended his failure to communicate with Nelson on the grounds that he 
could not have known where Nelson was, nor predict where Nelson might go. Yet 
he simultaneously claimed that he and Strachan worked out where Nelson was 
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likely to be, and where he was likely to go: “Lord Nelson on being informed of 
[the Toulon Fleet’s] escape from Port, even were it reported as steering westward, 
would proceed with his Squadron to the Coast of Egypt, or at least to some posi-
tion whence he might interrupt an attack on that Country, the Morea at Naples.”97 
Why not give that educated guess to an intrepid frigate captain, or at least to a 
ship at Gibraltar, with instructions to attempt to find Nelson? Strachan clearly 
thought this was the correct course of action. The Admiralty’s poor command 
design is partly to blame, but Orde’s lack of imagination and confidence contrib-
uted significantly. Orde also knew that Nelson was likely to come west as quickly 
as possible once news of the French transit of the strait reached him, but Orde 
downplayed the significance of this move by claiming that Nelson might be stuck 
in the Mediterranean for “five or six weeks, nay more,” while waiting for a favor-
able wind.98 In other words, Nelson was too far away and too unlikely to influence 
events in the Atlantic to be worth any effort to contact him—yet Orde thought 
it was worthwhile to send news to the East Indies Station, six months’ sail away.
On 1 May, Orde expressed surprise that his letters with news of Villeneuve’s 
escape were “unaccountably . . . preceded by account from Lord Mark Kerr who I 
trusted had gone in quest of Lord Nelson.”99 It was unaccountable because of the 
seam along the areas of responsibility at Gibraltar. Orde later claimed that both 
he and Kerr had intelligence that the Spanish ships were not prepared for a long 
voyage. Furthermore, “so confident were they at Gibraltar that the Toulon Fleet 
when seen passing the Straits were bound to Ireland” that Kerr sailed directly 
for Ireland, “instead of apprising Lord Nelson or Sir John Orde, as it would have 
been his duty in case of uncertainty.”100 We know that Kerr did attempt to apprise 
Nelson, and we also know that Kerr did not sail directly for Ireland. Instead, he 
landed at Portsmouth, and it was his news that first informed the Admiralty of 
the French passage of the strait.101 Orde knew more than Kerr—he knew that the 
French had combined with the Spanish in Cádiz, and he guessed that they were 
headed west. Orde’s strategic insight and educated guesses justified his own ac-
tions, but in failing to share those insights with Nelson he wasted much of their 
potency.
Among the more curious decisions that Orde made was to station Amphion, 
Wasp, and Beagle together off Cape Saint Vincent, rather than scattering them. 
One of the three should have gone to Gibraltar with the latest intelligence and to 
await Nelson. It did not require more than one cruiser to warn British shipping 
in the area about the presence of the French fleet. In his defense, Orde claimed 
that he left them “on [his] Station” with orders “to ascertain and counteract . . . 
the movements of the enemy.”102 They did no such thing, in the end, except for 
one nearly disastrous investigation of Cádiz’s harbor. A lieutenant from Wasp 
took a Portuguese fishing boat to Cádiz and reported that the entire Combined 
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Fleet was still there on 22 April—almost two weeks after it had left for the West 
Indies.103 Rather than relay this intelligence to Gibraltar, the senior captain sent 
it to Lisbon, where the British consul forwarded it on to the foreign secretary.104 
If a frigate or sloop had been stationed off Cádiz, such a mistake would not have 
been made; Orde’s claim that the frigates were “on [his] Station” may be techni-
cally true—his station included Cape Saint Vincent—but they were not optimally 
placed for intelligence-gathering purposes, nor were they given instructions 
about communicating with Nelson. Why this curious deployment? The archival 
record provides hints, but nothing definitive. By stationing three small ships on 
the western fringe of his station, Orde could claim that he had not abandoned it 
entirely; perhaps he thought they might capture prizes. We cannot know for sure, 
but Orde’s orders to his cruisers stand alongside his botched communication with 
Nelson as significant failures.
Orde also claimed that standing and fighting Villeneuve, or even hanging on 
his skirts as he thought Nelson might do, “would have led to the gratification of 
every wish of my heart, to superior command, to increased patronage and emolu-
ment, and possibly to great distinction.” Orde wanted credit for, in his words, “the 
sacrifice I have made” in forgoing the chance of bringing about a fleet action.105 
Even before he reached Spithead, he realized that running from the Combined 
Fleet exposed him to accusations of cowardice. This article’s analysis does not 
seek to accuse Orde of cowardice—he faced odds of three to one—but his plead-
ing is an indication of the pressure he and other British naval officers were under 
to fight no matter the odds.
Orde’s defense collapses amid internal inconsistences and obscures his true mo-
tives. He was fed up with his station off Cádiz, from which he had just requested 
to be allowed to resign. The rebuke by the Admiralty in January, coupled with 
the ongoing friction between his command and Nelson’s, had shattered his mo-
rale. Personal disputes with respected officers such as Strachan undermined his 
authority. He had made money from prizes, but those winnings were now under 
threat from the appointment of Nelson’s prize agent in Gibraltar and the legal 
battles over the legitimacy of Spanish prizes taken before the declaration of war. 
He thought his responsibilities were to blockade the Spanish (and capture prizes); 
the Admiralty thought he was there to blockade the Spanish (and protect British 
trade). When the French appeared, he was caught in a precarious situation with 
transports alongside and decks covered in stores. Outnumbered three to one, he 
sensibly retreated, but in doing so he neglected his most important duty: to put 
aside personal history and communicate across the boundaries of his area of re-
sponsibility. Orde’s failure cost Nelson a good chance of bringing the Combined 
Fleet to action in the West Indies.
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What-if history has limited value; of more importance, both for our under-
standing of the Trafalgar campaign and for navies today, are the preventable 
mistakes that both the Admiralty and Orde made. Some of the contributing 
factors are beyond the scope of this article: St. Vincent’s disastrously timed dock-
yard reforms had destroyed the fleet’s readiness during the recent peace, and the 
decision to strike the Spanish preemptively was morally dubious and strategically 
disastrous.106 But once a squadron was needed off Cádiz, there was no reason to 
appoint Orde to that post. He was senior to Nelson, with a history of conflict 
between them well-known to the public and certainly to Melville. Compounding 
this mistake were Orde’s strict instructions not to encroach on Nelson’s territory, 
even though Gibraltar is one of the world’s great choke points—all information in 
and out of the Mediterranean must past through it. Drawing a line across it was 
only likely to result in confusion and delay. Today, the United States organizes 
its combatant commands geographically. If it continues to operate this way, it is 
important to understand how geopolitics can warp traditional boundaries. For 
the British in the age of sail, bases in the Mediterranean itself were unreliable, 
poorly located, or underequipped; adverse winds easily could make the Strait of 
Gibraltar impassable; and the Spanish had major bases on both sides of the strait. 
Cádiz therefore should not have been separated from the Mediterranean com-
mand by placing it under a senior admiral.
The Admiralty bears responsibility for this mistake, although that is not suf-
ficient to explain what happened off Cádiz. It is easy to play armchair admiral 
about Orde’s actions in the face of an overwhelming enemy force. Orde handled 
the surprise on the afternoon of 9 April well, all things considered. He protected 
his transports, organized his forces, and prepared for action. Corbett’s assess-
ment of Orde’s subsequent retreat is sound. Orde helped concentrate British 
naval forces (which otherwise were spread dangerously thinly) on the Channel, 
lessening the chances of Napoléon’s fleets gaining control of the invasion route. 
Orde did not know much about Calder’s squadron off Finisterre, so subsequent 
accusations that he should have joined Calder do not stand up to scrutiny.107 
Indeed, it raises further questions about the Admiralty’s ability to coordinate its 
various commands.
Orde also communicated efficiently to the West Indies and the Admiralty. 
His failure was to the east, to Nelson. The actions of the officers on the spot sup-
port this judgment: Kerr tried to communicate with Nelson; Strachan tried to 
convince Orde to communicate with Nelson; and Nelson complained that Orde 
had not communicated with him. The Lords of the Admiralty had demarcated 
the command areas poorly and had given conflicting orders to their chosen com-
mander. Even if they did not grasp fully the problem presented by stationing a 
senior admiral off Cádiz, they trusted that such an experienced officer, familiar 
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